you would pluck out the heart of my mystery. 1 Revisionist accounts of Early Modern subjectivity almost invariably begin with Hamlet"s accusation. Elizabeth Hanson"s fine book Discovering the Subject opens with the phrase as a paradigmatic statement, in which Hamlet assumes the position of the modern subject, endowed with an inner mystery, and resistant to its penetration and discovery.
"equall to the sorrow of my heart" (Tragicall Historie, p. 42) But he does, like the recorder, have an interior, albeit one that seems to be a hollow space, a thing of nothing: and from that interior emanates "discourse", "most delicate", "most excellent music". If that music be not produced by external influence and manipulation, from the breath and fingering of others, then -where does it come from? What kind of recorder plays itself? What is the origin and nature of the subject?
The Q1 version of this classic observation ("You would search the very inward part of my hart,/And dive into the secreet of my soule") conveniently marks out the territory of the subjectivity debate as it has been woven around Hamlet. Hamlet was, as John Lee has shown, a test case for Cultural Materialism, and is a constant point of reference in histories of that movement. 9 Francis Barker in The Tremulous Private Body used Hamlet to demonstrate his contention that modern subjectivity did not exist before the later 17 th century:
At the centre of Hamlet, in the interior of his mystery, there is, in short, nothing.
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Hamlet"s sense of inwardness is "anachronistic", wrote Barker, since "bourgeois subjectivity"
had not yet arrived, and in the play "interiority remains gestural" (p. 163):
Pre-bourgeois subjection does not properly involve subjectivity at all, but a condition of dependent membership in which place and articulation are defined not by an interiorized self-recognition … but by incorporation in the body politic. (Barker, p.
31)
Catherine Belsey followed this same line, quoting Barker on Hamlet with approval. The modern subject, "the free unconstrained author of meaning and action, the origin of history" 11 was a later invention. The search for Hamlet"s "mystery", his "authentic inner reality" (Belsey, p. 41), is therefore a wild goose-chase:
The quest is, of course, endless, because the object of it is not there. (Belsey, p. 41) 9 John Lee, Shakespeare's 'Hamlet' and the Controversies of the Self (Oxford, 2000) . 10 Francis Barker, The Tremulous Private Body (London, 1984) 163-4. 11 Catherine Belsey, The Subject of Tragedy (London, 1985) 8.
To ascribe subjectivity to Renaissance characters is to posit an "imaginary interiority", imported into reading of the drama by modern ideological habits. Jean Howard further endorsed this view, and claimed that the "interiority and self-presence of the individual" belong to a later historical period.
12
Other critics such as Jonathan Goldberg and Patricia Fumerton took different but compatible views. They argued that there clearly was a perception of interiority, and a rhetoric of inwardness, in the Early Modern period; but this was externally generated, and externallyoriented. "The individual derived a sense of self ", wrote Jonathan Goldberg, "largely from external matrices". 13 "The private", wrote Fumerton, "could be sensed only through the public"; "the "self" was void".
14 In this critical context, to imagine that Hamlet had an inner life, a sense of inwardness and interiority, that he could be the subject of his own sentence rather than "subjected" to arrangements of knowledge and the ideological state apparatus, is to be helplessly under the sway of Barker"s "essential subjectivity", or Belsey"s "liberal humanism", to be taken in by "the idea of the autonomous, unified, self-generating subject".
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The theoretical underpinning of these arguments derives of course from Althusser and Foucault, particularly Foucault (and possibly, it has been argued, an oversimplification of Foucault). For Foucault interiority is produced by power, as in his discussion of "confession"
in The History of Sexuality:
Since the Middle Ages at least, Western societies have established the confession as one of the main rituals we rely on for the production of truth … One confesses -or is forced to confess. When it is not spontaneous or dictated by some internal imperative, the confession is wrung from a person by violence or threat; it is driven from its hiding place in the soul, or extracted from the body. But this is manifestly not the "Christian essentialism" diagnosed by Jonathan Dollimore, the person given unity and essence by the imputation of a "metaphysically derived" soul. clarity on the sources of interiority. Was it, is it, an "inescapable condition" (Maus"s phrase)
of human experience -something immanent, unchanging, a human essence? Or is it simply one of the effects produced by the operation of power on the human body and mind? Is "truth" "that which is susceptible to discovery", asks Hanson, or "that which is felt in resisting discovery"? (Hanson, p. 27) "It is difficult to know at this historical remove" admits Maus,
"whether the aggressions of the state produced furtiveness in its enemies or supposed enemies as a defensive reflex, or whether the secretiveness of the heterodox necessitated the regime"s attempt at surveillance". (Maus, p. 23) "Direct evidence of Prince Hamlet"s interiority … proves hard to find" (Lee, p. 90), perhaps because, as a reviewer of Lee"s book argues,
"interiority as such is precisely what can never be exhibited on stage". 26 We may grant the existence of inwardness, but still maintain that it is socially and ideologically produced.
I wish to argue that the single biggest difficulty afflicting the study of subjectivity in the 1980s was a systematic blindness to the stubborn fact of religious faith. It is my view that state interrogators and torturers discovered interiority in their victims because it was already there; and that it was there in such abundance because their victims believed what they professed. Katherine Maus suggests that Cultural Materialists denied the interiority of the subject because they themselves did not believe in it the religious implications of interiority:
. I propose to argue that it is only by giving due regard to religious belief that we would be able to locate an authentic and integral early modern subject at all. This is not to pretend that we can avoid the difficulty that any attempt to describe the interior world of faith could also be taken for a description of the social and ideological world in which that faith happens to find itself. It follows hard upon: however fully described, the inner space of faith could still be, as Maus describes it, simply the "inevitable result of religious oppression". (Maus, p. 16) But I want to suggest that it is rather more than that. Materialist is as much a scientific "naturalist" as the evolutionary biologist. Quae Non Videntur Augustine points to the obvious fact that many things on which human beings depend are invisible: the minds of others, thoughts, intentions and so on. Nonetheless all these have to be inferred, and they are predicated on the ground of belief. "Lo, out of your own heart, you believe an heart not your own". 31 The subjectivity of another is grasped via the subject"s own interior awareness of subjectivity. Human beings know that others have private spaces within, because we all have them. Hence Augustine"s model of subjectivity is immediately different from the "bourgeois subject", the "liberal-humanist subject", the "essential subject" of Cultural Materialism. It is not autonomous, or independent, or divorced from the human community. Augustine"s interiority is a space in which human beings meet one another in reciprocal understanding and mutual love. Inwardness is the space of community.
When veteran Cultural Materialist
Augustine"s Confessions demonstrate that what you find at the centre of the human being is not nothing, or a void, or just the reflection of external things. What you find is God. "I could not be then, O my God, could not be at all, wert thou not in me" 32 God is both inside and outside, both the subject of the sentence that is the believer, and the external power to which he is subject. Augustine knows that God is inside him, but still asks God to enter or re-enter him: "Behold, Lord, my heart is before thee … say unto my soul, I am thy salvation '. (p. 4) God is both self and other, both subject and object, both the agent and the object of the agent"s desire. The form of Confessions is of course by self-definition a confessional autobiography, and the reader is placed in the ambivalent position of hearing and overhearing both Augustine"s confession and the open secret of his life. We are listening to a man talking to God; but he is also addressing the reader, with a confessional invitation to share in an inner natural phenomena that we don"t yet understand". space into which God can also be invited. In this way the text generates a subjectivity-effect in the reader, but it is a subjectivity shared with the writer and with his audience. 2) The usefulness of this insight is that Early Modern notions of self, the subject, inwardness, were not necessarily incompatible with a view of the person as fully engaged in the body with somatic others and with a carnally affiliated environment. What Yves Bonnefoy called the "excarnation" of the world into body and spirit had yet to take place.
The Confessions
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For the pre-modern religious sensibility such as that found in St Augustine, the subject consisted of a solid, irrefutably material body which was sufficiently self-contained to house mind and spirit, but which was also physically and spiritually open to the divine. In belief there is an inside, but it is "accessible or corresponds to the outside". Faith is based on a willingness to accept the other into one"s interior, and a conviction that "the other is open to inhabitation by oneself".
Belief seems to be inseparable from an acceptance of the interpenetrability of self and other, self and world, or self and God, an acknowledgement of the outer world or of the other akin to its incorporation or introjection into one"s own bodily interior. (p.
28)
The sceptic by contrast "experiences the world as if it were made up of insides and outsides radically opaque to one another". Scepticism denies the inherence of inner in outer, and assumes a gap between inner truth and outer display. The sceptic assumes that outer display in others is probably misleading (actions that a man might play):
The sceptic"s own interior matches this closure, refusing entry to the other and simultaneously refusing egress to his own deepest self. He will not take the other in, nor will he allow himself to be taken in … In this way, the sceptic in effect renders "the inner" unknowable. (p. 28)
That within which passes show. What ties all this together in Christian belief is of course, uniquely, the Incarnation.
But Thomas one of the twelve, called Didymus, was not with them when Jesus came.
The other disciples therefore said unto him, We have seen the Lord. But he said unto them, Except I see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and put my hand into his side, I will not believe.
And eight days after, again his disciples were within, and Thomas with them. Then came Jesus, when the doors were shut, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace be unto you.
After said he to Thomas, Put thy finger here, and see my hands, and put forth thy hand, and put it into my side, and be not faithless, but faithful.
Then Thomas answered and said unto him, Thou art my Lord, and my God.
Jesus said unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou believest; blessed are they that have not seen, and have believed.
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The sceptic Thomas needs to pluck out the heart of Jesus" mystery before he will believe.
Jesus offers his interior for penetration, and in the offering breaks down the barrier between himself and his doubting disciple. "The stigmata and wound in his side", says Hillman, "literally puncture the boundary, the integument, separating him from the world". (Hillman, p.
31) As Hillman points out here, the scripture doesn"t actually say, notwithstanding the conventional representations of this scene, that Thomas does stick his fingers in. The offering is enough. "It is rather the offer of access or the sense of being granted access, to the interior (to the divine object or to the human subject of faith) that constitutes faith". (Hillman, p. 32) Later in the 17 th century the cult of the Sacred Heart founded by Sister Margaret Marie
Alacoque gave the most graphic expression to this idea of corporeal openness and infinite generosity of grace. Devotion to the Sacred Heart did not appear, as Michael Neill says, "first in baroque art": it was already well known to 13 th century monastics. 45 But it clearly came into its own with the Counter-Reformation.
The Protestant Reformation reconstituted the subject of faith as a disembodied spiritual subject in innumerable ways. Reinterpretation of the Eucharist diminished the literal incorporation of Christ into the body of the believer. Relics were suppressed; possession and exorcism treated with scepticism; stigmata denied; even the sacramental efficacy of unction rejected. All these reforms were disputes about the place of the body in worship, and particularly about whether the body was open or closed to the external world and to the divine. After the Reformation, the body was relatively closed.
In the poetic language of Hamlet we can see multiple possibilities of somatic subjectivity.
Man can be a pipe or a sponge. "The single and peculiar life" can be thought of as "bound/With all the strength and armour of the mind" (3.3.11-12), and as we have seen,
Hamlet furiously repudiates penetration. On the other hand he invites Gertrude to see into the "inmost part" of herself, and invites Horatio to dwell in his "heart"s core -ay in my heart of heart" (3.2.69) (where "core" is both "heart", cor, and the heart"s "inward part"). The body, it seems, and the self from which it is indistinguishable, ought ideally to be open to affection, Subjectivity is constituted by, but not limited to, the spiritual. It was experienced in a common way by people throughout the Christian era because their life was very largely constituted by faith. It seems not to be there, or to be inexplicable, or to be merely an image in a mirror, to those who read with the eyes and ears of scepticism. It is accessible to the modern reader who reads with the eyes and ears of faith.
Religion, after all, was what the common life of those times was about; and it is curious that radicals, who are supposed to take popular consciousness seriously, should so often be found skipping embarrassedly over the religious rituals and beliefs which bulked so large in it. No ideology in human history has been more persuasive and persistent than religion, a symbolic form which links the minutiae of everyday conduct to the most ultimate of spiritual realities, and it is hard to see that any ideology ever will be. The radical"s nervousness of religion is parochial as well as patronising; religion may not be the driving force in Middlesbrough, but it is in Dacca.
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